Marquette University

e-Publications@Marquette
Philosophy Faculty Research and Publications

Philosophy, Department of

4-1-2017

Review of Aristotle on Knowledge and Learning: The
Posterior Analytics by David Bronstein
Owen Goldin
Marquette University, owen.goldin@marquette.edu

Published version. HOPOS: The Journal of the International Society for the History of Philosophy of
Science, Vol. 7, No. 1 (Spring 2017): 173-176. DOI. © 2017 University of Chicago Press. Used with
permission.

Book Reviews | S P R I N G 2 0 1 7

are quite variable, but each offers an insightful perspective on early modern astronomy, astrology, or cosmology and fruitful avenues for future research.
Aviva Rothman, University of Chicago

David Bronstein. Aristotle on Knowledge and Learning: The Posterior Analytics. Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2016. Pp. xiii+272. $74.00 (cloth).

In this excellent book Bronstein interprets Aristotle’s Posterior Analytics (APo)
as uniﬁed by the Meno problem, understood as follows: (1) prior to seeking
whether S exists, either one knows what S is or one does not; (2) if one knows
what S is, one must already know that it exists; (3) if one does not know what S
is, then one cannot inquire whether it exists; (4) therefore, one cannot inquire
whether S exists. The problem is to be solved in two ways: ﬁrst through rejecting the presumption, implicit in point 1, that knowledge is an all or nothing
matter and, second, by showing that the term “what it is” is ambiguous and
that knowledge of “what it is” in one sense may fall short of scientiﬁc knowledge, but nonetheless allow for inquiry. Bronstein shows how Aristotle employs both of these solutions.
The major achievement of Bronstein’s book is to show how the APo can be
understood as a sequence of solutions to the Meno problem as it arises in different epistemological contexts. Each version of the Meno problem concerns the
epistemological presumptions of the solution before. Thus APo 1.1 wonders about
how a particular truth can be learned while ignorant of the particular at issue;
the solution is that the universal knowledge that makes possible the new knowledge in a sense is knowledge of the particular and in a sense is not. This solution
presupposes demonstration, which, Bronstein argues, is productive of new knowledge for the practicing scientist engaged in inquiry. New knowledge is acquired
through demonstration insofar as the knowledge of the conclusion is in a sense
present in the knowledge of the premises. Demonstration presupposes knowledge of causally basic essences.
The Meno problem concerning the inquiry into these essences arises because
Aristotle is convinced that true scientiﬁc inquiry must be inquiry into real features of the world. Hence the inquiry into an essence cannot get off the ground
unless one knows that the kind of which the essence is being sought is some-
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thing real, but a version of the Meno problem arises: How can one know this
unless one knows what the kind is? The problem is solved in 2.8–10 through
distinguishing different modes of knowing the “what it is” of some kind or attribute. Preliminary nonscientiﬁc accounts allow the investigator sufﬁcient epistemological toehold for the inquiry into what the kind is. His account presupposes that one already has a grasp of the indemonstrable principles of the sciences,
which Bronstein, following Ross and me, takes to be deﬁnitions of the simple
kinds that are considered as the subjects by the sciences studying the attributes.
The Meno problem arises, again, concerning the inquiry into these simple essences. It is solved in 2.13, where Aristotle advocates a version of Plato’s method
of division for the sake of ascertaining this essence. The use of this method in
the case of inquiry into essences presupposes preexistent knowledge of basic
differentiae. How is it that one can learn the relevant differentiae, prior to collating them by the method of division? Again, the answer lies in distinguishing
different senses by which something is known. APo 2.19 shows how perception
gives us the necessary preexisting knowledge to allow the inquiry to proceed.
Bronstein understands the Posterior Analytics to be offering an overarching
account of the temporal progress of scientiﬁc research into a fact S is P. Revising the inﬂuential interpretation of Charles, Bronstein takes the stages of scientiﬁc inquiry into a fact to be as follows: “At Stage 1, we do not know whether a
subject S exists and we seek whether it exists. At Stage 2, we know that S exists,
and we seek what it is (its essence). At Stage 3, we know what S is, and we seek
whether P belongs to it as one of its demonstrable attributes. At Stage 4, we know
that P belongs to S as one of its demonstrable attributes and we seek why it belongs (the cause). At Stage 5, we know why P belongs to S” (6). Bronstein’s Aristotle is concerned with method, how scientiﬁc inquiry proceeds, and not merely
with the logical and conceptual relations that hold among the elements of those
explanatory schemes at which one arrives.
In the remainder of this review, I will signal and indicate problems with some
of the key interpretative moves that Bronstein makes and will take issue with one.
One of the classic problems concerns the relationship between nous (intellection),
demonstration, and induction. Bronstein accepts a standard account of induction as a mode of reasoning by which a universal (characteristic or predication)
is discerned through particulars and takes the point of APo 2.19 to be that the
human mind is such as to be able to do this. The problem concerns how to reconcile this with the teaching that nous is that by which a universal principle is
grasped. The traditional account has it that nous is a kind of intuition, which,
given appropriate perceptions, will lead to a cognitive grasp of the explanatory
principles at work. In recent decades there has been a move away from attrib-
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uting to Aristotle the extravagant view that human beings have such a powerful
epistemological principle; this move is in part motivated by the problem of how
to integrate the “intuitionist” notion that nous grasps the principles of science
with Aristotle’s view that these principles are attained only after hard work. The
main alternative (the “explanationist” interpretation) is that nous secures deﬁnitions only by grasping that they are the principles that will do the explanatory
work that needs to be done. Bronstein rejects this view, since he holds Aristotle to a
strict temporal time line according to which stage 3 of inquiry, the inquiry into
what S is, must precede stage 5, the attaining of an explanation of why S is P. Accordingly, Bronstein thinks that a grasp of a deﬁnition as a deﬁnition must precede the noetic grasp of the deﬁnition as grounding demonstrations. The method
of division is that by which we have the prenoetic grasp of the deﬁnitions. But this
simply reproduces the problem that the intuitionist and explanationist lines of
interpretation are meant to solve. How is it that the mind grasps differentiae and
demonstrated attributes of the kind in question and is able to distinguish them?
The alternatives seem to be intuition, selection on the basis of explanatory power,
or some combination of the two.
Bronstein follows Ross and me in taking Aristotle’s theory of explanation to
rest on the metaphysical distinction between subject and attribute; the inquiry
into the essence of a subject has a different form, and a different role in the time
line of inquiry, than that of the inquiry into the essence of an attribute. The subject need not be a true metaphysical subject; all that matters is that, like “line”
in geometry, it is regarded as a subject by the science that studies it. Bronstein
distinguishes basic subjects such as line or animal from “subordinate subjects”
such as human being, which are to basic subjects as species to encompassing genera. “Triangle” he takes to be a subordinate subject and distinguishes it from demonstrable attributes such as eclipse. This raises problems for Bronstein that
he does not adequately address: Aristotle is explicit that the geometer proves that
there are triangles, which suggests that there is a demonstration in which “triangle” or perhaps “is a side of a triangle” is the predicate term. A demonstration
might be something like Euclid Elements 1.1, which could be understood as
showing that a certain (equilateral) triangle exists, on the basis of ﬁrst principles
concerning the basic subjects of line and circle. Conﬁrmation of this can be found
in APo 1.10 76b9, where deﬂection and verging, which, like a triangle, arise when
more than one straight line stands in a certain relation, are classiﬁed as demonstrable attributes. I therefore suggest that an item such as triangle and eclipse
have the same status: they are the attribute of a basic subject’s standing in a certain relation to another subject and, as such, are properly to be understood as
predicates of the basic subjects (although language can be simpliﬁed so that both
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“triangle” and “eclipse” can stand as grammatical subjects). I note that Bronstein
incorrectly attributes to me the view that attributes, like eclipse and (forming a)
triangle (in relation to other lines), are to be identiﬁed with subordinate subjects
(170). I agree that this is wrongheaded; further, I think that it is wrong to understand triangle as a subordinate subject. Aristotle does not think that triangle is a
kind of line.
The interpretation of a text as thorny as the Posterior Analytics is bound to
elicit some disagreements. What Bronstein gets wrong should not obscure how
very much he gets right, not least of which is his discerning a coherent line of
argument that runs through the whole text and his showing how Aristotle had
a very great deal to say on how scientiﬁc inquiry is to be conducted.
Owen Goldin, Marquette University

Jean De Groot. Aristotle’s Empiricism: Experience and Mechanics in the Fourth Century BC. Las Vegas, NV: Parmenides, 2014. Pp. xxv+442. $127.00 (paper).

This is quite a fascinating book. The work is an extended argument, thoughtfully organized with careful attention to detail and sourcing. I cannot speak to
whether the argument will be convincing to all. But I cannot envision the argument being presented any better.
The author’s overriding thesis is that mechanics played a much more substantial role in the development of Aristotle’s natural philosophy than has previously been appreciated and that appreciating the role mechanics played leads
to a more subtle and nuanced understanding of key aspects of Aristotle’s natural philosophy. Somewhat more speciﬁcally, I see three intertwined theses as
central to the author’s overall argument:
i) the (relatively uncontroversial) view that even before Aristotle’s time,
basic mechanics, especially those involving the lever and related devices,
were well understood, including a solid understanding of the quantitative principles underlying the workings of such devices;
ii) that this understanding of mechanics played a key role in the development of Aristotle’s philosophy of nature (including but not limited to
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